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ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: PROGRESS
TOWARD A COHERENT STANDARD
FOR THE "THRESHOLD DETERMINATION"
Concern for the environment' is a long recognized value of soci-
ety,2 but is relatively new to law.3 In the National Environmental Pol-
icy Act of 1969 (NEPA),4 Congress incorporated mandatory consid-
eration of environmental effects into the approval procedures for
federal projects. Many states responded to the federal commitment to
informed environmental decisionmaking by enacting similar legisla-
tion.5 Washington enacted the State Environmental Policy Act
(SEPA)6 in 1971, which required that consideration be given to envi-
ronmental factors for all developments proposed by either private or
public entities.7
The legislature delegated authority8 to promulgate rules for SEPA's
interpretation and implementation to a specially created state agency,
the Council on Environmental Policy (CEP).9 The CEP was specifi-
1. Environment may be generally defined as that collection of surrounding influ-
ences and forces, natural, social and cultural, which shape communities into the com-
posites observed. See WEBSTER'S THIRD NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 760 (1961).
The term "environment" should be distinguished from two related terms, "conserva-
tion" and "ecology." A function of conservation is planned utilization of natural re-
sources, balancing the tension between preservation and consumption. See id. at 483.
Ecology represents a third point of view with respect to resource allocation. It is that
branch of science which deals with the relationship of a community to its environment
and which focuses upon quantifiable measures of these complicated interrelationships.
See id. at 720.
2. In an 1831 essay entitled "A Fortnight in the Wilds," Alexis de TocqueviIle said:
Man gets accustomed to everything .... He gets used to every sight. An ancient
people.., is vanishing daily like the snow in sunshine, and disappearing from view
over the land. In the same spots and in its place another race is increasing at a rate
that is even more astonishing. It fells the forests and drains the marshes; lakes as
large as seas and huge rivers resist its triumphant march in vain. The wilds become
villages, and the villages, towns. The American, the daily witness of such wonders,
does not see anything astonishing in all this. This incredible destruction, this even
more surprising growth, seems to him the usual progress of things in this world.
A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 734-35 app. V (J. Mayer & M. Lerner ed.
1966).
3. In the past two decades, Congress has been very actively enacting new legisla-
tion, e.g., 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1136 (1976) (Wilderness Act), and revising existing legis-
lation, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-18571, 1858, 1858a (1970) (Clean Air Act).
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321, 4331-4335,4341-4347 (1970).
5. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 46.35.020, .030 (1977); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111 , §§
1001-1051 (Smith-Hurd 1977); CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 21060-21176 (West 1977).
6. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 43.21C.010-.910(1976).
7. Id. § 43.21C.020.
8. Id.§ 43.21C.110.
9. Id. NEPA establishes a Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), 42 U.S.C. §§
4341-4344 (1970), which has authority similar to the CEP, but is very different in struc-
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cally directed to detail the procedures for completion of the "thresh-
old determination,"1 0 the test to determine whether an environmental
impact statement (EIS) must be prepared. Responding to this task, it
issued the SEPA Guidelines'1 in December 1975, the culmination of
two years of extensive drafting and public hearings.12
This comment will discuss the choice of the agency required to
make the threshold determination 13 and will outline how the determi-
nation should be made. Preparation of an EIS is required whenever
"major actions significantly affecting the quality of the environ-
ment"' 4 are proposed. Theoretically, all actions are subject to the
threshold determination analysis because there are no express excep-
tions to the statute. 15
Preparation of an EIS requires a significant expenditure of re-
sources, 16 and, perhaps more importantly, often involves considerable
delay. 17 Thus, in the interest of economic efficiency' 8 and social wel-
fare, 19 the procedure for completing the threshold determination
ture. The CEQ is a permanent federal agency which is directed to recommend policies
and to undertake annual review of the effect of NEPA. The CEP was not permanent,
and has been incorporated into the Department of Ecology. WASH. REV. CODE §
43.21C. 100 (1976).
10. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C.1 10(I)(b) (1976).
11. WASH. ADMIN. CODE §§ 197-10-010 to -910 (1976).
12. Foreword to SEPA Guidelines, WASH. ADMIN. CODE §§ 197-10-010 to
-910 (1976). The Guidelines became effective on Jan. 16, 1976.
13. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 197-10-040(33) (1976).
14. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C.030(2)(c) (1976).
15. There are, however, limited exemptions in the SEPA Guidelines. See note 57
and accompanying text infra.
16. For example, in assessing the impact of a proposed Trans-Canada natural gas
pipeline, Judge Berger of British Columbia held public hearings in forty-five municipal-
ities. These hearings produced 281 volumes of testimony (40,791 pages), from which a
245 page report was written. Berger, The Berger Report: Northern Frontier, Northern
Homeland, LIVING WILDERNESS, April/June 1977, at 4, 5.
17. "A final and perhaps most dangerous dysfunctional consequence has been that
of delay. The external process into which the EIS has evolved defies the expressed intent
of the Act's authors that it be efficient." Dreyfus & Ingram, The National Environmen-
tal Policy Act: A View of Intent and Practice, 16 NAT'L RESOURCES J. 243, 260 (1976).
Cf. Parkridge v. City of Seattle, 89 Wn. 2d 454, 573 P.2d 359 (1978) (SEPA should not
be used to delay a project merely because it is unpopular).
18. At equilibrium in an efficient free market system (pure competition), price,
marginal cost and marginal revenue are equal, and resources are optimally allocated.
Although it may be difficult to quantify precisely, it is not impossible to establish an
economic value for environmental factors. See, e.g., J. DALES, POLLUTION, PROPERTY,
AND PRICES (1968); Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
19. According to one economics text:
Economics broadly defined is a study of a society's use of scarce resources with ref-
erence to (1) the extent to which they are used, (2) how efficiently they are used, (3)
the choice between competing alternative uses, and (4) the nature and consequence
of changes in productive power of the resources over time.
R. LIPSEY & P. STEINER, ECONOMICS 9 (2d ed. 1969). To maximize social welfare, costs
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should be as simple as possible, yet maintain an acceptable balance
between the competing policies of informed environmental decision-
making20 and continued economic expansion.
Four inquiries are essential to the analysis of how the threshold de-
termination should be made:
(1) By whom should the decision be made?
(2) When should it be made?
(3) What procedures should be followed?
(4) Upon what facts should the decision be based?
involved in meeting a society's desire to expand must be minimized to promote effi-
ciency. The policy of resource allocation must incorporate the factor that a society is
generally willing to assume greater risks than individuals because it has the benefit of
spreading any resulting loss. See generally H. RAIFFA, DECISION ANALYSIS (1968); R.
SCHLAIFER, ANALYSIS OF DECISIONS UNDER UNCERTAINTY 137-98 (1969).
20. See Loveless v. Yantis, 82 Wn. 2d 754, 513 P.2d 1023 (1973); Stempel v. De-
partment of Water Resources, 82 Wn. 2d 109, 508 P.2d 166 (1973); Merkel v. Port of
Brownsville, 8 Wn. App. 844, 509 P.2d 390 (1973).
At present, local zoning boards, typically county commissioners, have jurisdiction to
make the threshold determination. Their authority is delegated through statutes and the
state constitution, which manifest the belief of the legislature and the electorate that lo-
cal zoning control is appropriate. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE §§ 35.63.010-.120 (1976).
There is some dispute as to the validity of such a grant. Haskell argues that local con-
trol is currently not efficient with respect to its structure, finance and planning, but may
be in the future. Haskell, Land Use and the Environment: Public Policy Issues, 5 ENVIR.
REP. Monograph 20 at 11 (BNA 1974). In fact, there is precedent for central control.
Michigan adopted a statute which created an agency having jurisdiction over the envi-
ronment, but left that agency powerless. Lanning, State Management of the Environ-
ment Part One: An Evaluation of the Michigan Experience, 8 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 286,
307-08 (1975). See also Markey, Science and Law-Toward a Happier Marriage, 59 J.
PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 343 (1977) (expressing concern over the ability of laymen to decide is-
sues combining science and law).
A single state agency responsible for the preparation of threshold determinations and
environmental impact statements would eliminate duplication of costs and talent and
would enhance consistency in decisionmaking. Environmental costs would be better
distributed across the state rather than allocated according to the level of local concern
and the consequences of development, especially given that the location of natural re-
sources is not controllable. The collection of expertise into a single state agency would
result in superior analysis and a more thorough understanding of the state's environ-
mental policy.
Reasonable expertise is especially important in Washington because of the doctrine
of appearance of fairness. Review must be fair in both substance and appearance. Smith
v. Skagit County, 75 Wn. 2d 715, 453 P.2d 832 (1969). The doctrine asks "whether a
fair-minded person in attendance at all of the meetings on a given issue, could, at the
conclusion thereof, in good conscience say that everyone had been heard.., and that the
legislative body... gave reasonable faith and credit to all matters presented .... " Id. at
741, 453 P.2d at 847.
An aura of impropriety or partiality, even if ungrounded in fact, is sufficient to be a
violation. Chrobuck v. Snohomish County, 78 Wn. 2d 858, 480 P.2d 489 (1971) (alter-
nate holding). Impropriety may occur whenever the decisionmaker does not appear ob-
jective. Buell v. City of Bremerton, 80 Wn. 2d 518, 495 P.2d 1358 (1972). Arguably,
lack of scientific expertise could be a ground for invocation of the appearance of fair-
ness doctrine, especially when an agency fails to implement an interdisciplinary ap-
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The fourth inquiry may be further analyzed in three independent seg-
ments: what is a major action, what constitutes the scope of the
environment, and when is that environment "significantly affected"?
In completing this analysis of the threshold determination process,
the SEPA Guidelines' test for the determination will be presented
along with a synopsis of the Washington and federal decisions21 and
the legislative history of NEPA. The determination of significance
will be emphasized because it has been the most problematic element
of the test. Also, because it is important to understand the policies in-
corporated into the SEPA Guidelines in order to appraise effectively
and critically their results, the Guidelines' procedures will be applied
to a set of facts which have a known outcome.
Norway Hill Preservation & Protection Association v. King County
Council22 provided an appropriate opportunity for the Washington
Supreme Court to test the utility of the SEPA Guidelines. The court,
however, refused to order compliance with the Guidelines, stating
that they had not become effective at the time the threshold determi-
nation had been made by the local board and, consequently, should
not enter the decisionmaking process at the appellate review stage.23
Nevertheless, the court ultimately overturned the decision of the local
zoning board and ruled that an EIS should be prepared. 24 Either Nor-
way Hill represented a situation in which it was difficult to make the
threshold determination correctly, 25 or it indicated that bias at the lo-
cal decisionmaking level may lead to undue risk of environmental
damage.2 6 These two alternatives are discussed in conjunction with an
proach in its study of the environmental factors. Creation of a single state agency might
obviate this problem.
21. The Washington Supreme Court has stated in dicta that it is appropriate to in-
corporate federal law and policies into interpretations of SEPA because it is virtually a
verbatim transcription of NEPA. Eastlake Community Council v. Roanoke Assocs., 82
Wn. 2d 475, 513 P.2d 36 (1973). The amendments made by the Washington legislature
appear to strengthen the goal of environmental protection. E.g., WASH. REV. CODE §
43.21C.020(3) (1976) ("fundamental and inalienable right to a healthful environment").
22. 87 Wn. 2d 267, 552 P.2d 674 (1976).
23. Id. at 277 n.7, 552 P.2d at 680 n.7.
24. Id. at 278, 552 P.2d at 681. The court held that the King County Council deter-
mination that the stipulated major action would not have a significant impact was
"clearly erroneous." The action, therefore, was subject to the SEPA procedures. Id. at
279, 552 P.2d at 681.
25. The court found that there was a significant effect even though the project was a
logical extension of the surrounding use, was given extensive consideration, and was
consistent with the comprehensive zoning plan. Id. at 279, 552 P.2d at 681.
26. The court stated that the project was significant on its face in spite of the local
board's decision. Id. at 278, 552 P.2d at 681. This interpretation of Norway Hill was ac-
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analysis of the utility of the SEPA Guidelines in making the threshold
determination.
I. BY WHOM SHOULD THE DETERMINATION BE
MADE?
A "responsible official" of the "lead agency" having jurisdiction
over the proposed action is charged by law with the duty to prepare a
detailed statement on the potential environmental impact of the ac-
tion.27 The responsible official is defined as that person or group of
persons within the lead agency designated by the agency's guidelines
to act on its behalf.2 8 The lead agency is that agency charged with the
duty to make the threshold determination and to supervise any subse-
quent activity initiated by the proponent of the action;29 it is responsi-
ble for implementing the policies of SEPA.30
An agency which proposes an action or which is the first to be ap-
proached by the proponent should also determine which is to be the
lead agency3l by following the detailed directions of the Guidelines.3 2
Generally, there are three major rules for assigning status. An agency
which is also the proponent will be its own lead agency.33 If only one
agency has jurisdiction,34 it will be designated. 35 A priority system
cepted by the Washington Court of Appeals in City of Richland Homeowner's Preserva-
tion Ass'n v. Young, 18 Wn. App. 405, 568 P.2d 818 (1977).
27. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C.030(2)(c) (1976). See also 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c)
(1970). Ordinarily, this will be accomplished by requiring the proponent of a develop-
ment to submit background information which will be reviewed independently by the
responsible official.
28. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 197-10-040(30) (1976). The responsible official is char-
teristically charged with the discretion to decide whether an agency permit for the pro-
posal should be issued. See Eastlake Community Council v. Roanoke Assocs., 82 Wn.
2d 475, 513 P.2d 36 (1973).
29. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 197-10-040(19) (1976) (definition). See also id. §§ 197-
10-200 to -270, -345 (detailing the function and obligations of the lead agency).
30. Id. § 197-10-200. The lead agency must see that crisis decisionmaking which
often leads to catastrophic envrionmental damage is avoided. The solution is to evalu-
ate factors while there is still an opportunity to choose alternative courses of action.
Eastlake Community Council v. Roanoke Assocs., 82 Wn. 2d 475, 496, 513 P.2d 36, 49
(1973).
31. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 197-10-203(1) (1976). If a dispute arises over the valid-
ity of the designation, the CEP, now a part of the Department of Ecology, has power to
resolve it. Id. §§ 197-10-203(2) to (4), -260. The lead agency is selected from those
agencies which have jurisdiction, that is, those agencies which are asked to issue nonex-
empt licenses for the project or which will act on applications for grants or loans to fi-
nance the proposal. Id. 197-10-040(4).
32. Id. §§ 197-10-205 to-230.
33. Id. § 197-10-205.
34. See note 31 supra (jurisdiction defined).
35. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 197-10-215 (1976).
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should be followed if neither of these conditions is satisfied. 36 For ex-
ample, if a city or county has jurisdiction, it will be declared the lead
agency ahead of competing agencies.37 However, agreements between
potential lead agencies may alter the Guidelines' pattern of appoint-
ment,3 8 and certain types of proposed actions, such as thermal power
generation and use of geothermal energy, are dealt with specifically. 39
Finally, the responsibility may be transferred in certain circum-
stances, 40 even after a "declaration of non-significance" 41 has been
prepared and entered.42
The lead agency determination has never been an important issue
in Washington's decisional law. Because the Guidelines provide a de-
terminative, but flexible procedure for assigning status, no problems
should arise. Should there be any difficulty, the Guidelines provide an
appeal mechanism for resolution of the dispute. 43
II. WHEN MUST THE THRESHOLD DETERMINATION
BE MADE?
It is a fundamental policy of SEPA that agencies make reasoned,
informed decisions 44 on proposed actions while reasonable alterna-
tives are still available. 45 The process should begin early46 to allow
adequate time to collect data and to review it in a meaningful way.47
36. Id. § 197-10-225.
37. Id. § 197-10-220.
38. Id.§ 197-10-240.
39. Id.§ 197-10-230.
40. Id. § 197-10-235 (allows transfer in the limited circumstance when a small lo-
cal entity has lead agency priority but a state agency better suited to decisionmaking has
concurrent jurisdiction).
41. The declaration of non-significance, sometimes called a negative declaration, is
the written decision by the lead agency that a proposal will not have a significant
adverse impact. Id. § 197-10-040(9).
42. Id. § 197-10-345 (procedure to be followed). In such cases the agency assuming
lead agency status must supervise the drafting of an EIS. Id. § 197-10-545(3).
43. Id. § 197-10-260.
44. See, e.g., Norway Hill Preservation & Protection Ass'n v. King County Coun-
cil, 87 Wn. 2d 267, 552 P.2d 674 (1976); Juanita Bay Valley Community Ass'n v. City
of Kirkland, 9 Wn. App. 59, 510 P.2d 1140 (1973). See generally Berger, The Berger
Report: Northern Frontier, Northern Homeland, LIVING WILDERNESS. April/June 1977,
at 4.
45. Eastlake Community Council v. Roanoke Assocs., 82 Wn. 2d 475, 513 P.2d 36
(1973).
46. Loveless v. Yantis, 82 Wn. 2d 754, 765, 513 P.2d 1023, 1029-30 (1973).
47. Eastlake Community Council v. Roanoke Assocs., 82 Wn. 2d 475, 513 P.2d 36
(1973).
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SEPA states that an EIS should be included in "every recommenda-
tion or report on proposals for legislation and other major actions"
which significantly affect environmental quality. 48 The threshold de-
termination must be made well before any reports of a proposal are
filed in order to "[u] tilize a systematic interdisciplinary approach" 49
in environmental decisionmaking, and to account for the considerable
amount of time spent in preparing a final EIS. Unfortunately, the
SEPA directive does not clarify the proper time to institute the proc-
ess, even when the judicial decisions interpreting SEPA are included
in the analysis. The SEPA Guidelines, however, have made a contri-
bution to resolving this confusion, although they address the timing is-
sue in a somewhat convoluted fashion.
A section in the Guidelines entitled "Recommended Timing for the
Threshold Determination"50 would appear to be directed to the
question of when to begin the process. However, it establishes only
the amount of time which the process is estimated to take.51 The sec-
tion provides that fifteen days should be adequate to prepare for and
to complete the threshold determination. An introductory section
specifies that the process should be instituted at a stage when the pro-
posal is sufficiently definite that meaningful environmental analysis
may be undertaken.52 The determination should be started as soon as
possible after the lead agency has been appointed, 53 but no later than
the time actual construction begins on a proposal54 or licenses and
permits for such work are issued.55
In summary, the threshold determination should be as early as pos-
sible, yet at a stage when the proposal will be concrete-that is, when
it has solidified to the extent that meaningful review may be accom-
plished. 56 Although imprecise, the Guidelines add some substance to
the statutory law.
48. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C.030(2)(c) (1976).
49. Id. § 43.21C.030(2)(a).
50. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 197-10-305 (1976).
51. Id. (usually not to exceed 15 days).
52. Id.§ 197-10-055.
53. Id. § 197-10-310(2) (may begin as soon as an application is filed with the lead
agency).
54. Id. § 197-10-055(2).
55. Id.
56. Subject to the Guidelines, agencies have authority to establish more definite
provisions for the timing of the EIS process by adoption of individual rules or guide-
lines. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C.110 (1976); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 197-10-055(1)
(1976). An agency must follow the procedures of the Guidelines when enacting such
methods. Id. § 197-10-800 to -860.
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III. WHAT PROCEDURES SHOULD BE FOLLOWED?
The Guidelines divide the threshold determination into two parts.
To require preparation of an EIS, a proposed action must be "major"
and must have a "significant effect." All actions are presumed to be
major unless specifically excluded by the Guidelines.57 The "major
action" test, therefore, involves an examination of possible exemp-
tions. If an action is not exempted, the lead agency should complete
an environmental checklist 58 and should make a determination of sig-
nificance based upon its findings.59
The significance determination "must be based upon information
reasonably sufficient to determine the environmental impact of a pro-
posal."'60 Usually, the lead agency will require that a proponent inde-
pendently complete a checklist, and this is the suggested format under
the Guidelines. 61 Should the lead agency need additional information,
it may require the proponent to conduct additional research and field
investigation 62 for those areas specifically covered by the checklist. 63
The lead agency may institute its own studies, 64 or consult with other
agencies, 65 and it must investigate the potential impact until it is ade-
quately informed whether the proposal will have a significant effect.66
57. WASH. ADMIN. CODE §§ 197-10-150 to -190 (1976). WASH. ADMIN. CODE §
197-10-170 focuses upon particular activities as exemptions whereas § 197-10-175
deals with classification on the basis of the lead agency involved. For example, issuance
of certain permits does not fall within the confines of SEPA. Examples of exempted ac-
tivities include repair of existing facilities where no expansion or alteration of use oc-
curs, appropriations of less than one cubic foot per second of surface water, animal con-
trol licenses, and all actions of the state legislature.
In Marino Property Co. v. Port of Seattle, 88 Wn. 2d 822, 567 P.2d 1125 (1977), the
Washington Supreme Court recognized the applicability of the "categorical
exemptions" of § 197-10-170. It stated that the purpose of the Guidelines was to sug-
gest a logical interpretation of the requirements of SEPA, and, therefore, it should fol-
low the Guidelines' directives. The court also noted that SEPA is directed to use, not
ownership. Id. at 830-31, 567 P.2d at 1129-30.
58. Cf. WASH. ADMIN. CODE §§ 197-10-050, -100 (1976) (a checklist must be filed
with all applications).
59. Id. § 197-10-360(1).
60. Id. § 197-10-10-330(1). Fear has been expressed that proponents will write
EIS's in unwarranted situations to avoid the necessity of establishing a basis for a nega-
tive declaration because preparation of an EIS may be easier. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN-
STITUTE, FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 358 (1974).
61. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 197-10-330(l)(a) (1976).
62. Id. § 197-10-100(3) (1976). "Agencies may not require a complete assessment
or 'mini-EIS' at this [checklist] stage." Id. § 197-10-100(2).
63. Id. § 197-10-330(1)(a).
64. Id. § 197-10-330(1)(b).
65. Id. § 197-10-330(1)(c).
66. Id. § 197-10-320.
166
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If the agency determines that the action is significant, the agency must
prepare a draft EIS, usually with the cooperation of the proponent.
67
If the agency determines otherwise, it must enter a declaration of
non-significance. 68 Either decision is subject to modification,69 but
modification should be used with reservation to avoid the appearance
of unfairness.70
IV. UPON WHAT FACTS SHOULD THE DECISION BE
BASED?
The threshold determination answers this question: Is this a major
action which significantly affects the quality of the environment?7'
The relevant issues are first, what is a major action; second, what con-
stitutes the environment; and third, when does an action significantly
affect the environment?72 Although this approach differs from the
generally adopted procedure, 73 a tripartite approach is more appro-
67. Id. § 197-10-320(2)(b). The proponent and the lead agency must follow the pro-
cedures of the Guidelines, id. §8 197-10-350, -400 to -695, and the lead agency must
register a declaration of significance form, id. § 197-10-355, completed in accordance
with the directions stated in WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 197-10-350.
68. Id. § 197-10-320(2)(a). In complying with the procedural dictates of § 197-10-
340, the lead agency must utilize substantially that form recommended in § 197-10-
355.
69. Id. 88 197-10-370, -375.
70. See note 20 supra (discussion of the appearance of fairness doctrine).
71. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C.030(2)(c) (1976).
72. The court has power to be influential in developing standards for analysis be-
cause the determination of significance is a question of law. See Norway Hill Preserva-
tion & Protection Ass'n v. King County Council, 87 Wn. 2d 267, 273, 552 P.2d 674, 678
(1976) (more than a simple finding of fact); Leschi Improvement Council v. State High-
way Comm'n, 84 Wn. 2d 271, 285, 525 P.2d 774, 784 (1974) (conclusion of an agency
about environmental matters is a question of law).
The significance test is similar to the obviousness test of patent law where three
inquiries are to be made. The first is a general overview to describe the area of concern;
the second, a search for the essence of the proposal; and finally, a focus on surrounding
elements, but only to an extent which meets with unstated policies.
Describing the application of 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1970), the Supreme Court said:
Under § 103, the scope and content of the prior art are to be determined; differ-
ences between the prior art and the claims at issue are to be ascertained; and the
level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art resolved. Against this background, the
obviousness of the subject matter is determined.
Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966).
Although the test is not precisely defined, see, e.g., Note, Standards of Obviousness
and the Patentability of Chemical Compounds, 87 HARV. L. REV. 607 (1974), the deter-
mination of obviousness is so closely analogous to the determination of significance that
the obviousness test may be useful in delimiting the standards of significance to be ap-
plied.
73. Most jurisdictions divide the threshold determination into two segments, major
actions and significant effects. E.g., Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390 (1976), rev'g
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priate. In the usual analysis, the attributes of the environment are pre-
sumed and are assumed to remain static. In reality, they are dynamic.
Although the elements of the environment are rigidly defined at any
given time, the definition is likely to change over time to reflect
changed policies. 74 Because the scope of the environment may
change, it should be analyzed as an independent variable.
A. What is a Major Action?
A primary goal of SEPA is full disclosure of environmental impacts
through a process which leads to reasoned decisionmaking.75 Thus,
courts have carefully limited the number of exempted actions which
escape the rigors of the significance test. A "major action" is defined
as any "discretionary non-duplicative stage" arising in the course of a
proposed development which requires agency approval.76 Almost all
Sierra Club v. Morton, 514 F.2d 856 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d
823 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973); CEQ Guidelines 40 C.F.R. §
1500.6 (1976); Druley, Federal Agency NEPA Procedures, 7 ENVIR. REP. Monograph
23, at 10 (BNA 1976). However, there has been substantial criticism; the critics suggest
a single test. E.g., City of Davis v. Coleman, 521 F.2d 661 (9th Cir. 1975); Minn. Pub.
Interest Research Group v. Butz, 498 F.2d 1314 (8th Cir. 1974); F. Anderson, NEPA IN
THE COURTS 89-96 (1973); Comment, Environmental Lai': Judicial Review of Federal
Agency Actions Under NEPA, 28 OKLA. L. REV. 866 (1975). The critics of the two-fold
test primarily fear that very significant impacts may not trigger the initial major action
threshold. For example, individual private developers could have constructed small por-
tions of the Norway Hill project without SEPA violation because independent develop-
ment is categorically exempted. WASH. REV. CODE § 197-10-170(l)(a) (1976). But, be-
cause of the cumulative effect, the proposed development initiated by a single developer
did require preparation of an EIS. Norway Hill Preservation & Protection Ass'n v.
King County Council, 87 Wn. 2d 267, 552 P.2d 674 (1976).
In determining whether an action has met the first prong of the two-pronged test, the
agency must consider all contemplated development logically following from the pro-
posal rather than limiting its review to the precise proposal. See Part IV-B, infra. See
also Loveless v. Yantis, 82 Wn. 2d 754, 513 P.2d 1023 (1973) (a purpose of SEPA is the
avoidance of progressive degradation). However, Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390
(1976), a 7-2 decision, may confuse the cumulative effect standard. The Court found
that a study being conducted on the utility and feasibility of developing and producing
Northern Great Plains coal did not trigger the EIS preparation requirements, although
each possible proposal under consideration, if selected, would meet the threshold deter-
mination standard because of its devastating environmental consequences. The Court
said that no proposal had been adopted as the means for development, and that without
such a decision, it would be mere speculation to attempt to categorize the impacts asso-
ciated with it. The Court held that the study was an action which was not sufficiently ripe
to allow meaningful review. See 55 N.C.L. REV. 484 (1977). Cf. 52 N.D.L. REV. 601
(1976).
74. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 197-10-444 (1976) (limits the scope of review to the
elements listed).
75. Eastlake Community Council v. Roanoke Assocs., 82 Wn. 2d 475, 513 P.2d 36
(1973).
76. See, e.g., id. at 490, 513 P.2d at 46 (refers to issuance of permit authorizing con-
struction). See also Loveless v. Yantis, 82 Wn. 2d 754, 513 P.2d 1023 (1973).
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actions pass this judicial hurdle in the SEPA examination because
consideration is given to the total proposal and to its cumulative ef-
fects.77
"Action" is defined circularly by the Guidelines as "an activity po-
tentially subject to the environmental impact statement requirements
of [SEPA] .,78 The range of desired coverage may be broadly cate-
gorized as including governmental licensing, sale of public and
private lands, zoning, waste disposal, and transportation as well as
other types of planning and practice.79 All actions are presumed to be
major unless specifically exempted.8 0 This approach simplifies the de-
termination process. If the exemptions are selected to reflect sound
social policy, this method is conservative because it operates to pro-
tect the environment during investigation of the impact of the pro-
posal.
The Guidelines delegate authority to lead agencies to stipulate en-
vironmentally sensitive areas within their jurisdictions for which
preparation of an EIS is likely to be required.8' Through this mecha-
nism, agencies are able to presume not only that the action is major,
but that, within an area, the effect of any action will be significant.8 2
For the purposes of the threshold determination, a proposal is de-
fined to include all activity functionally related to the proposed ac-
tion, including the potential direct and indirect impacts.8 3 This
definition, however, is not so simple as it may appear.8 4 The problem
of bioaccumulation is illustrative.8 5 Relatively small amounts of pol-
77. Juanita Bay Valley Community Ass'n v. City of Kirkland, 9 Wn. App. 59, 510
P.2d 1140 (1973). But cf. Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390 (1976) (action not ripe for
review while only at the planning stage).
78. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 197-10-040(2) (1976).
79. Id.
80. Id. § 197-10-040(24) (definition of major action). Examples of exempted ac-
tivities include minor new construction such as construction of a barn or less than four
residential units, inspections by any agency for any purpose, open burning permits, li-
censes or approvals to gather firewood, and issuance of hunting licenses or tags. See id.
§ 197-10-177.
81. Id.
82. But see id. § 197-10-160. The nature of the site thus places a heavier burden
upon the proponent to show that there will not be damage to the environment through
development.
83. Id. § 197-10-060(2) (total proposal defined). An agency should consider
whether the total proposal will induce additional growth or serve as a precedent for fu-
ture proposals or zoning changes. Contemporaneous causally connected development
must be included in the evaluation. Id. § 197-10-060(4), (5) (allowing limitation of the
scope of the proposal at the discretion of the lead agency in particular circumstances).
84. See, e.g., City of Davis v. Coleman, 521 F.2d 661, 673 (9th Cir. 1975).
85. See, e.g., Clayton, Pavlou & Breitner, Polychlorinated Biphenyls in Coastal
Marine Zooplankton: Bioaccumulation by Equilibrium Partitioning, 11 ENVT'L ScI. &
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lutants may combine to form toxic substances or may accumulate in
the environment with the ultimate toxic effect. For example, small
discharges of mercury into waterways, believed to disperse harmlessly
because the concentration of the pollutant was greatly reduced by di-
lution, were discovered to accumulate in the tissues of fish and crusta-
ceans, organisms which served as amplifiers for the mercury along the
food web. Sufficient increase in concentration occurred until detri-
mental reactions were observed in people and livestock. 86 A major
problem resulted from the complexity of the pollution problem; an
unseen ripple in one corner of the environmental pool had become a
tsunami. Similarly, other potential indirect impacts may be initially
overlooked.
B. What Constitutes the Environment?
The underlying policy and purpose of NEPA was expounded by
Senator Henry Jackson. Its "action-forcing" procedures 87 were in-
tended to reduce problems created by federal projects, such as over-
crowding and congestion, haphazard growth, and inconsistent or in-
coherent land use.8 8 Senator Jackson stated,
An environmental policy is a policy for people. Its primary concern
is with man and his future. The basic principle of the policy is that we
must strive, in all that we do, to achieve a standard of excellence in
man's relationships to his physical surroundings. If there are to be de-
partures from the standard, they will be exceptions to the rule and the
policy. And as exceptions, they will have to be justified in light of
public scrutiny.8 9
TECH. 676 (1977) (theoretical approach to ascertaining the factors which control bioac-
cumulation); Weber, The Pesticide Scorecard, 11 ENVT'L SCI. & TECH. 756 (1977) (sur-
vey of toxicological effects, biological distribution and fate of chemical pesticides in the
environment).
86. See, e.g., F. D'ITRI, THE ENVIRONMENTAL MERCURY PROBLEM (1972).
87. 115 CONG. REC. 19009(1969).
88. 115 CONG. REC. 40417 (1969). NEPA was also intended to prevent loss of open
spaces, to avoid critical air and water pollution problems, to diminish loss of recreation
areas, to limit soil erosion, to avoid degradation of unique ecosystems, to promote de-
velopment of efficient and effective transportation systems, to improve design and aes-
thetic planning, to lessen noise, and to regulate the use of chemicals, and was intended
to protect any other concerns. Id. These goals embodied the principal axioms of ecol-
ogy. Aldo Leopold wrote, "A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity,
stability, and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise." A.
LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC 240 (1966). Harmony between man and his envi-
ronment was the ultimate goal; symbiosis was preferred to parasitism.
See also WASH. REV. CODE § 43.2 IC.010 (1976) (the purposes of SEPA).
89. 115 CONG. REC. 19009 (1969).
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To fulfill these goals, SEPA states that an interdisciplinary ap-
proach90 for review of the impact should be instituted.9' To satisfy the
wish that information be gathered on all of man's surroundings, the
search should be as broad as is reasonably possible.92
The SEPA Guidelines attempt to define more precisely the scope of
the relevant environment.93 By restricting the domain which is subject
to consideration, the Guidelines adopt policies deemed suitable by the
state to protect the environment and to reduce the labor required of
the lead agency. The underlying policies may change, however, and if
they do, the scope of the environment should be changed accord-
ingly.94
The Guidelines' definition divides the "environment" into two ma-
jor subdivisions: the physical and human environments. 95 The central
focus of the physical environment is resource management, 96 while
that of the human environment is the individual's interaction with her
surroundings. 97 For example, the human environment encompasses
the effect of transportation systems, energy use, health, recreation,
and aesthetics as part of one's enjoyment of the environment.
Washington's approach to defining the scope of the environment
differs only slightly from that employed by the Council on Environ-
90. See WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C.030(2)(a) (1976) (analogue of the NEPA dic-
tate). See also WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 197-10-330 (1976) (lead agency must consult
other agencies at the threshold determination stage); id. § 197-10-465 (directory of
agencies specifying their areas of expertise).
91. Senator Jackson believed that knowledge should be drawn from "the broadest
possible range of social and natural scientific knowledge and design arts" when plan-
ning or considering the utility of a proposal. 115 CONG. REC. 40419 (1969).
92. Because the value of particular items in the environment is difficult to quantify,
economic policy may not be a valuable factor in the analysis. Even if economic policy is
not a pivotal consideration, improving the procedure to add a more definite structure
for completing the analysis would promote certainty, efficiency, and equality.
93. "Environment means, and is limited to, those areas listed in WAC 197-10-
444." WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 197-10-040(13) (1976).
94. The Guidelines are a legislative synthesis of the policies of SEPA. By confining
the environment to a limited class of concerns, the legislature has decided that this speci-
fied portion of the environment is, for Washington purposes, all that must be reviewed
to make acceptable decisions. The legislature must believe that these areas encompass
the broad spectrum which will provide the protection SEPA desires. See WASH. REV.
CODE §§ 43.21C.010, .020 (1976). There is no reason to believe that this decision will
be static.
95. See WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 197-10-444(2), (3) (1976). NEPA is concerned with
the human environment only. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c) (1970). Therefore, SEPA might re-
quire an even greater depth of study. See also WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C.020(3) (1976)
(the environment is a fundamental interest). However, comparison of the goals and the
scope of review shows that approximately the same area is protected.
96. The physical environment is composed of earth, air, water, flora and other ele-
ments. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 197-10-444(2) (1976).
97. Id. § 197-10-444(3).
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mental Quality (CEQ).98 Under NEPA the environment is unlimited.
The CEQ Guidelines suggest areas of consideration in much the same
manner as the SEPA Guidelines,9 9 and cover the same general
areas, 100 but reflect a federal policy that strict formalism might be
counterproductive. 10 1 Although the SEPA Guidelines may be suscep-
tible to an interpretation which would encompass expanding environ-
mental concerns, as do the federal guidelines, it is uncertain whether
they will be so interpreted.
Merely listing the components of the environment, however, is in-
sufficient to reveal the required scope or intensity of the lead agency's
search of the potential impacts on each element. The components are
not individually defined, nor is the locale for the search categorized.
Thus, the Guidelines offer no concrete advice to resolve these
issues. 102 Instead the Guidelines rely upon the implicit assumption
98. See CEQ Guidelines, 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500.1-.14 (1977); F. GRAD, TREATISE ON
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 9.02 at 9-39 (1977).
99. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500.6(b), .14 (1977).
100. Id. § 1500.6(b).
101. Oversight could lead to irreversible harm which might not be detectable with
sufficient quickness to impede environmental damage. By allowing agency input into
the scope of the environment while requiring review of specified areas, better protection
may be afforded. The lead agency could correct the fault of the formal system.
102. An example will best serve to illustrate the problem of whether a search should
be local, multi-district, intrastate, interstate, or international.
Photochemical smog is the product of a complex system of interrelated reactions, es-
pecially between sulphur dioxide (SO2 ), nitrogen oxides (NOx) and hydrocarbons. Sea
aerosol serves as a suitable medium for condensation of reactants, and, thus, is an effec-
tive catalyst for the system. J. SEINFELD, AIR POLLUTION, PHYSICAL AND CHEMICAL FUN-
DAMENTALS (1975). See also S. FRIEDLANDER, SMOKE, DUST, AND HAZE: FUNDAMENTALS
OF AEROSOL BEHAVIOR (1977); Bottenheim, Braslavsky & Strausz, Modeling Study of
Seasonal Effect on Air Pollution at 60'N Latitude, 11 ENVT'L SCl. & TECH. 801 (1977).
Smog is a well-known and widely publicized problem of the Los Angeles Basin. Since
there are three counties in the basin, it is unclear which should act as lead agency for any
proposed development. Under the Washington system, the county approached by the
proponent would be designated the lead agency (subject to appeal), although it may not
be the most appropriate choice.
The basin is a vast urban area which has widely diverse atmospheric characteristics
due to the topology. Torrance is an industrial city in Los Angeles County and supports
oil refining as a major business. However, the smog which is partially a consequence of
its industry does not plague it. Instead of remaining over Torrance, the emissions are
carried by sea breezes northward to collect against the San Gabriel Mountains which
form the natural boundary of the basin. Characteristically, Torrance will be clear while
Pasadena will be submerged in smog. Because Torrance will not realize the effect of its
development, it may not be a suitable entity to decide.
The collection of smog in Pasadena is really just the beginning of the smog problem.
Nightly breezes carry the smog eastward into San Bernardino County, where, unfortu-
nately, there is little outlet for it. The smog will settle there and its toxicity will be en-
hanced by photochemical reaction and addition of further pollutants. Only a minor
amount will drift across the San Gabriels to rest and linger in the outlying communities
of the San Bernardino desert.
This multidistrict problem may not be adequately considered at the local scale. There
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that persons reasonably skilled in assessing environmental impacts
will conduct a reasonable analysis and will obtain expert assistance
whenever they believe it necessary in interpreting the legislative sug-
gestions. 103 The Guidelines alleviate some of the uncertainties of the
scope of the environment by limiting the number of areas subject to
review. The state's policy is reflected by this definition of the environ-
ment. Unfortunately, the degree of intensity required is not discerni-
ble; either it will have to be ascertained by experts who can provide
the necessary specificity to the vague directions, or the court will have
to address the issue. For the present, certainty and equality of
application are lacking.104
C. What Facts Determine Significance?
1. The judicial standard
In a 1973 decision, the Washington Supreme Court adopted the
generally accepted federal standard' 05 for determining whether an ac-
tion significantly affects the quality of the environment. 06 The proce-
are a multitude of potential lead agencies, the outlying desert communities being the
least likely to come to mind when industrialization is proposed in Torrance. Failure to
consider the project thoroughly may result from local bias of the decisionmaker or from
lack of understanding of the development's potential consequences.
This example presents two problems that are coupled in their resolution. First, which
entity should be the decisionmaker, and, second, how broad an inquiry should it be ex-
pected to undertake? When proposals are suggested, their consequences are often very
uncertain or unknowable, especially to a parochial local board. Proposals do not have
widespread publicity in most cases, and, therefore, a decision may be made before im-
portant voices are heard. Unless it is clear that a sufficiently in-depth inquiry will be
conducted so that degradation is avoided, the proper protection will not be effectuated.
Hindsight is not an adequate remedy or consolation. A better statement of the pertinent
policy of SEPA is necessary to resolve these problems, and to eliminate delay which
presently prevails while agencies act under uncertainty.
When considering a rezone and the sufficiency of an EIS prepared to assess the im-
pact thereof, the board must serve the welfare of the project's entire affected community
by protecting against potentially serious impacts not typically within the board's juris-
diction. The court has stated that the policy of SEPA is to encourage interjurisdictional
planning and cooperation. Save a Valuable Environment v. City of Bothell, 89 Wn. 2d
862, 576 P.2d 401 (1978).
103. Reasonable persons may differ, and there is no guarantee that the local deci-
sionmaker will have the requisite expertise to assess the problem. See note 20 supra.
104. The court has said that multidistrict planning is encouraged by SEPA, but it
has given no indication of how such planning should be instituted, or how much is re-
quired. Save a Valuable Environment v. City of Bothell, 89 Wn. 2d 862, 576 P.2d 401
(1978).
105. Hanly v. Kleindienst (Hanly I1), 471 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412
U.S. 908 (1973).
106. Narrowsview Preservation Ass'n v. City of Tacoma, 84 Wn. 2d 416, 526 P.2d
897 (1974).
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dure announced required lead agencies to consider the direct environ-
mental effects caused by the proposed development, and to attempt to
quantify the absolute impact, including anticipated cumulative
effects.107 This test proved unsatisfactory, however, because it was
subjective; 108 it gave the lead agency so much discretion that the con-
sistency and stability of decisionmaking was suspect. 10 9 The two re-
quirements of the test were obvious factors to consider, but offered lit-
tle guidance on how to proceed.
Cognizant of the weaknesses of the test, the Washington Supreme
Court decided in Norway Hill Preservation & Protection Association
v. King County Council' 10 that because SEPA required decisionmak-
ing based on full consideration of pertinent environmental data,"' the
threshold determination test should be modified and expanded. 11 2 It
recognized that a general guideline rather than a value-laden defini-
tion would be a more appropriate means to delimit the significance
test.113 Consequently, the court stated that "the procedural require-
ments of SEPA ... should be invoked whenever more than a moder-
ate effect on the quality of the environment is a reasonable probabil-
ity."' 14 In addition, in order to have the necessary flexibility to review
a lead agency's decision in a meaningful way, the court readopted and
applied the twofold standard of Stempel v. Department of Water
Resources.115 This test combines the "clearly erroneous" test 116 with
the "arbitrary and capricious" standard of review. 117 The result is a
107. Id. at 423, 526 P.2d at 902.
108. Norway Hill Preservation & Protection Ass'n v. King County Council, 87 Wn.
2d 267, 277, 552 P.2d 674, 680 (1976) ("a precise and workable definition is elusive be-
cause judgments in the area are particularly subjective").
109. Many decisions have been reversed on appeal without making clear the basis
for the decision. E.g., id.; Swift v. Island County, 87 Wn. 2d 348, 552 P.2d 175 (1976);
Sisley v. San Juan County, 89 Wn. 2d 78, 569 P.2d 712 (1977).
110. 87 Wn. 2d 267, 552 P.2d 674 (1976).
I ll. Id. at 272, 277, 279, 552 P.2d at 677, 679, 680.
112. Id. at 272-76, 552 P.2d at 677-79. See also Swift v. Island County, 87 Wn. 2d
348, 552 P.2d 175 (1976).
113. 87 Wn. 2d at 278, 552 P.2d at 680.
114. Id.
115. 82 Wn. 2d 109, 508 P.2d 166 (1973).
116. The "clearly erroneous" test, codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 34.04.130(6)(e)
(1976), requires that an appellate court reviewing the entire record be "left with the def-
inite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." Ancheta v. Daly. 77 Wn.
2d 255, 259-60, 461 P.2d 531, 534 (1969).
117. The "arbitrary and capricious" test, codified at WASH. REV. CODE §
34.04.130(6)(f) (1976), requires that the decision be based on a consideration of the rele-
vant factors contained in the record. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401
U.S. 402 (1971). To overturn, the court must hold that the decision was a wilful and un-
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test of reasonableness which allows a court the opportunity to con-
duct a review of the merits, although the court must still give substan-
tial weight to the lead agency's determination. 118
The combination of the reasonability guideline for the significance
test together with the Stempel standard of judicial review yields a test
for the threshold determination similar to the federal "standard of
reasonableness." 119 In fact, the Washington Supreme Court relied
upon a Ninth Circuit decision, City of Davis v. Coleman,120 as au-
thority for its significance guideline. In Davis, however, the federal
court of appeals dealt with the standard of judicial review, not with
the definition of significance. Because the Washington court did not
distinguish the settings involved, and because it placed direct reliance
on Davis as support for its guideline, one can infer that the court be-
lieved the issues involved in the two determinations to be similar. Im-
plicitly, the Washington court adopts the standard of reasonableness
for judicial review although it prefers to label it under terms prevail-
ing in the existing Washington law.
The standard of reasonableness is similar to the analysis proposed
in Justice Friendly's dissenting opinion in Hanly v. Kleindienst (Hanly
II),121 and it represents a substantial change in Washington law.
Explaining the test more thoroughly, the Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, in Davis, identified the relevant question to be whether it is un-
reasoning action which disregarded the facts. Northern Pac. Transp. Co. v. Washington
Util. & Transp. Comm'n, 69 Wn. 2d 472, 418 P.2d 735 (1966).
118. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C.090 (1976). The new standard allows the court to
consider a broad base of factors including important public policies such as SEPA's fulldisclosure requirements and economic efficiency. Utilizing such a standard, the court
should prove to be a valuable check in the EIS process. See Sisley v. San Juan County,
89 Wn. 2d 78, 569 P.2d 712 (1977); Newaukum Hill Protective Ass'n v. Lewis County,
19 Wn. App. 162, 574 P.2d 1195 (1978).
However, the court may be withdrawing from full exercise of its power, and return-
ing to use of only a part of the Stempel review standard. In Lassila v. City of Wen-
atchee, 89 Wn. 2d 804, 576 P.2d 54 (1978), the court stated that the appropriate review
standard was the clearly erroneous standard alone, relying on Norway Hill. Id. at 817,
576 P.2d at 61. Unless the arbitrary and capricious test is but a subset of the clearly er-
roneous test, the court has contracted its power. In any case, it has not adequately
explained the rationale for this change.
119. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE, FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 356 (1974);
Comment, Environmental Law: Judicial Review of Federal Agency Actions Under
NEPA, 28 OKLA. L. REV. 866 (1975); Note, Threshold Determinations Under Section
102(2)(c) of NEPA: The Case For "Reasonableness" As A Standard For Judicial Re-
view, 16 WM. & MARY L. REV. 107 (1974).
120. 521 F.2d 661 (9th Cir. 1975).
121. 471 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973). Judge Friendly
believed that an action was significant whenever it arguably would have an adverse en-
vironmental impact. Id. at 830-3 1.
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reasonable to conclude that the project will have an adverse im-
pact. 122 It stated that "[the] threshold test is met when a plaintiff
'alleges facts which, if true, show that the proposed project would
materially degrade any aspect of environmental quality.' "123
The Norway Hill decision is a step toward obtaining a manageable
definition of significance and a structure within which to make the
threshold determination, but it still leaves considerable latitude to the
lead agency. When coupled with the Stempel review standard, 124 Nor-
way Hill increases court control of the threshold determination. Yet,
the decision provides little additional guidance to lead agencies seek-
ing to comply with the procedural mandates of SEPA.
2. The administrative approach
The SEPA Guidelines have provided a structure-the environmen-
tal checklist 125 -through which elucidation may be forthcoming. 126
The checklist presents a series of questions designed to be answered
by responses of "Yes," "No," and "Maybe," covering all aspects of the
environment as defined by the Guidelines. Each applicant must com-
plete a checklist upon application to a lead agency, 127 unless the pro-
ponent and the lead agency agree to proceed immediately to drafting
an EIS. t2 8 All questions answered "Yes" or "Maybe" must be ex-
plained and supported with necessary information.' 29 Upon receiving
a completed checklist, the lead agency must make an independent
assessment of the potential impact, indicating its answers to the ques-
tions on the same form which the proponent used. 130
122. 521 F.2d at 673.
123. Id. (quoting Environmental Defense Fund v. Armstrong, 487 F.2d 814, 817
n.5 (9th Cir. 1973)).
124. See notes 115-18 and accompanying text supra.
125. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 197- 10-365 (1976).
126. Id.§ 197-10-050. See also id.§ 197-10-310.
127. Id.§ 197-10-310.
128. Id. § 197- 10-300(2). Such a means of avoiding the formality of the threshold
determination could lead to the preparation of too many EIS's, because it may be easier
to prepare an EIS immediately rather than attempting to provide an adequate record to
support a negative declaration. See ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE, FEDERAL ENVI-
RONMENTAL LAW 358 (1974). Economics dictates that only those actions which meet the
policy threshold should be burdened with the preparation of an EIS. See notes 18 & 19
supra. See also Norway Hill Preservation & Protection Ass'n v. King County Council,
87 Wn. 2d 267, 277, 552 P.2d 674, 677-78 (1976).
129. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 197-10-310(1) (1976). The lead agency may not re-
quire the proponent to prepare a mini-EIS at the threshold determination stage. Id. §
197-10-100(2).
130. Id. § 197- 10-320(1). The checklist serves as a means of verifying the "good
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Although designed for convenience, 31 the checklist does not elimi-
nate all of the problems. First, although individual checklist questions
indicate both adverse and beneficial consequences, the Guidelines
limit the overall consideration by the lead agency to adverse im-
pacts. 132 They state that "[t] he question at the threshold determina-
tion level is not whether the beneficial aspects of a proposal outweigh
its adverse impacts, but rather if the proposal involves any significant
adverse impacts upon the quality of the environment .... No test of
balance shall be applied at the threshold determination level."' 33
Overall, the checklist provides protection for environmental interests
by establishing a very conservative standard. Since the decisionmaker
should be an expert, however, the elimination of balancing is argu-
ably neither justified nor worthwhile. 3 4
A second problem in the Guidelines is that they do not specify the
level of indicated adverse impacts which is necessary to require the
preparation of a draft EIS.135 "It is probable there will be affirmative
answers to several of these questions while the proposal would still not
necessarily have a significant adverse impact .... ,"136 The actual
threshold is ultimately left to the discretion of the lead agency subject
only to judicial review. 137 The Guidelines could be improved by clari-
faith" of the proponent as well as preparing a record for the purposes of the appearance
of fairness doctrine. See note 20 supra.
131. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 197-10-305 (1976) (the checklist should be completed
in a matter of hours).
132. Id. §§ 197-10-320(2)(a), -360(2).
133. Id. § 197-10-360(3). There is a dispute as to whether this is a proper policy. In
both Hanly v. Kleindienst (Hanly 11), 471 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412
U.S. 908 (1973), and City of Davis v. Coleman, 521 F.2d 661 (9th Cir. 1975), the courts
considered only significant adverse impacts, but other federal decisions are not as res-
trictive. E.g., Hiram Clarke Civic Club, Inc. v. Lynn, 476 F.2d 421 (5th Cir. 1973). Two
agencies in the federal system have taken the view that an EIS should be prepared even
when a beneficial result is probable. EPA Regs., 40 C.F.R. §§ 6.200-.306 (1976); Coast
Guard Regs., 40 Fed. Reg. 49,383 (1975).
The strongest statement against this policy appears in the opinion of Citizens Orga-
nized to Defend the Environment, Inc. v. Volpe, 353 F. Supp. 520 (S.D. Ohio 1972),
where the court said that a significant effect is any important and meaningful, detrimen-
tal or beneficial alteration of any aspect of the environment made directly or indirectly.
Id. at 540. Economics probably supports limitation because it is likely that other
sources in society will supply information on beneficial effects.
134. The Guidelines' policy may be too protective and may lead to too many EIS's.
Its conservative approach seems to be in tension with other policies important to the
state such as growth. Balancing would increase the lead agency's discretion; eliminating
it may provide greater uniformity at the local level while still leaving the courts with
substantial authority to influence the direction of environmental protection.
135. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 197-10-360(3) (1976) (any significant adverse impact
triggers the EIS preparation process).
136. Id. § 197-10-360(2).
137. The Norway Hill standards allow the courts to influence and protect the state's
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fying this necessary level of impact. Completed checklists could be
published as examples. Agencies could compare the checklists which
they develop with these examples in order to divine the state's envi-
ronmental policy from the vague statutory language. A clearer legisla-
tive statement of the underlying policy would also reduce the uncer-
tainty.
The form of the checklist questions poses another problem. Some
questions lack the specificity to make them useful measures. For
example, an affirmative answer to the question, "Will the proposal re-
sult in: (a) air emissions or deterioration of ambient air quality?,"1 38
must be given if either there are emissions or there is deterioration. 139
Most developments will produce emissions during the construction or
operation stages. 140 The drafters must have contemplated .that an
emissions threshold be met before an affirmative answer to this ques-
tion is required. 141 The proponent will probably not be familiar with
such an implied threshold, and will almost always answer the first
part of the question affirmatively. 142
The second part of the question is similarly lacking in utility.
Whereas emissions are characterized easily and observed readily, de-
terioration of ambient air quality is much more difficult to determine
without resorting to speculation. Actual determination of deteriora-
tion requires the development of an atmospheric model,' 43 but the
environmental policy. See notes 110-24 and accompanying text sutpra.
138. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 197-10-365(2)(11)(2) (1976).
139. Id. § 197- 10-365(2).
140. Only minor construction is exempted. See, e.g., WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 197-
10- 170(I) (1976).
141. For example, open burning permits are categorically exempted, id. § 197- 10-
170(14), although emissions are characteristically associated with burning.
142. The proponent, however, may supplement that answer with an explanation. Id.
§ 197- 10-365(2).
143. Modeling attempts to reduce a natural phenomenon to a mathematical expres-
sion which may be tested when significant variables are altered. An algorithm for solv-
ing the problem and to represent the observed facts must be developed. If the model
which accomplishes this mapping is of general applicability, it may be used to estimate
resulting characteristics of the system. Air pollution modeling is particularly complex
as it combines physical transport phenomena with multiple chemical reaction kinetics.
Exact solutions may not be obtainable but estimates may be made and checked for the
important equations. See S. FRIEDLANDER, SMOKE, DUST, AND HAZE: FUNDAMENTALS OF
AEROSOL BEHAVIOR (1977); J. SEINFELD, AIR POLLUTION, PHYSICAL AND CHEMICAL FUN-
DAMENTALS (1975); Morgan, Monitoring the Quality of Ambient Air, II ENVT'L SC. &
TECH. 352 (1977); Bottenheim, Braslavsky & Strausz, Modeling Study of Seasonal Ef-
fect on Air Pollution at 60*N Latitude, II ENVT'L SC. & TECH. 801 (1977).
Another example of the complexity of the problem may be seen in smelter pollution.
Emissions from smelters do not appear to be dangerous to the unwary observer, but ex-
perience shows that the trace metals contained in particulate emissions do cause sub-
stantial damage. See Ragaini, Ralston, & Roberts, Environmental Trace Metal
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amount of time, energy, and expertise necessary to develop a suitable
model to answer this question would transform the checklist into an
abbreviated EIS,14 4 and would thereby conflict with an expressed
purpose of the Guidelines. 45 Also, the amount of work involved
would be grossly disproportionate to that required by the first half of
the disjunctive. The question is reasonable, however, and should be
answered. Deterioration of air quality is, after all, what is often
sought to be controlled. 146
The checklist has a number of questions which require models to
answer them properly, that is, to answer them in a manner which rep-
resents reasoned decisionmaking. Even for those questions concerned
with the human environment, modeling has proven a useful technique
for quantifying the so-called unquantifiables such as aesthetics and so-
cial impacts.' 47 The use of modeling, however, requires a computer
and an expert to operate it. Local decisionmakers often lack both. A
recommended solution which would also promote optimal use of mo-
deling would be to create a unified state agency to coordinate and
complete threshold determinations. Objective, adequate review could
then be established. 48
The Guidelines have provided a structure within which to oper-
ate,' 49 but they have not adequately particularized the "significantly
Contamination in Kellogg, Idaho, Near a Lead Smelting Complex, 11 ENVT'L SCI. &
TECH. 773 (1977).
144. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 197-10-100(2) (1976).
145. Id. § 197-10-365 (agencies are to answer the checklist questions as com-
pletely as possible based upon the information available to them).
146. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C.010(2) (1976).
147. Modeling assists the decisionmaker not only by providing more detailed an-
swers, but also by reducing the level of local bias impressed upon the decision. Exten-
sive research is being conducted on the suitability of modeling social impacts. The early
models are encouraging, and they already aid in reducing the subjectivity. E.g., OLSEN
& MERWIN, BATTELLE HUMAN AFFAIRS RESEARCH CENTERS, TOWARD A METHODOLOGY
FOR CONDUCTING SOCIAL IMPACT ASSESSMENTS USING QUALITY OF SOCIAL LIFE INDICA-
TORS (1976); Calligan, Craig, Devine, Newberger, & Osborne, The Oregon State Simu-
lation Model: A Laboratory for Policy Makers (1976) (on file at Washington Law Re-
view); Pease & Smardon, Perception and Assessment of Visual Attributes of Scenic
Rivers in Oregon (Sept. 1976) (a proposal submitted to the National Science Founda-
tion, on file at Washington Law Review).
148. A state agency would increase uniformity, would reduce problems associated
with the interdisciplinary approach desired, would be more readily alterable when poli-
cies change, and would spread the cost among all those who benefit from environmental
protection rather than levying disproportionate assessments on some due to their loca-
tion close to environmentally sensitive areas.
149. The actual checklist form is flexible so long as all of its concerns are covered
by questions framed in substantially the same language. The checklist is supplementary
to other procedural requirements invoked by federal, state or local law. WASH. ADMIN.
CODE § 197-10-365(1) (1976).
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affecting" test. In addition, the competing policies of full considera-
tion and the expense and inconvenience of rigorous analysis have not
been clearly merged. Both the decisional law and the legislative guide-
lines are deficient in some respects, although they represent progress
toward delimiting the amorphous boundaries of the threshold deter-
mination.
V. THE ENVIRONMENTAL CHECKLIST AND THE
NORWAY HILL FACTS
The utility of the environmental checklist may be tested against the
Norway Hill facts. Completed checklists for projects which are "obvi-
ously" significant and for those which are difficult to predict from a
cursory analysis of the major components of the project should have
markedly different characteristics. Norway Hill, however, may indi-
cate a contrary result. Use of the checklist to analyze the Norway Hill
facts should demonstrate the obvious significance of the project, the
result reached by the court without a checklist. The proposal, how-
ever, was apparently one for which the issue of significance was genu-
inely difficult to resolve.
A. What Facts Influenced the Norway Hill Court?
In Norway Hill, a developer of single family, residential develop-
ments applied for a preliminary plat for a fifty-two acre tract located
just south of Bothell. 150 The proposed plat described 198 lots in an
urban-type development including sewers, streets, sidewalks and utili-
ties.15' The King County Council, acting through its administrative
departments, studied the proposal extensively, assessing its compli-
ance with applicable county ordinances. 152 It approved the plat, and
entered a "negative threshold determination" as required by SEPA. A
citizens' group appealed to the council twice, seeking reconsideration
of the determination, first, because of inadequate soil studies, and sec-
ond, because of subsequent enactment of an applicable county ordi-
nance. 153 After each appeal the council re-evaluated its determination
150. 87 Wn. 2d at 269, 552 P.2d at 675.
151. Id. at 269, 552 P.2d at 676.
152. Id.
153. KING COUNTY, WASH., CODE §§ 20.44.010-.170 (1976) (county environmental
policy ordinance, including criteria for determining the significance of a proposal).
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and re-entered a negative declaration. 54 The citizens' group petitioned
the superior court for a writ of certiorari, claiming that the council,
by approving the plat without requiring an EIS, had acted unlawfully.
The court denied the writ, and the group appealed. 155
The Washington Supreme Court held that the proposed action was
significant, "[s] ince the Norway Vista project on its face involves the
size and type of environmental change to which the full information
requirement of SEPA was obviously meant to apply.' 56 Although the
project was a logical extension of the surrounding area, was consid-
ered extensively by the council, and was consistent with the compre-
hensive zoning plan and the present uses of the surrounding land, the
court held that the project would be a complete change of the existing
use.' 57 The development, therefore, would have a significant effect-
an effect which should be examined under SEPA.158
B. How Would the Environmental Checklist Have Been
Completed?
The facts of Norway Hill do not allow a complete assessment of the
checklist, 159 because they are not sufficiently developed in the opinion
to provide answers to many of the checklist questions. 60 Neverthe-
154. 87 Wn. 2d at 270, 552 P.2d at 676.
155. Id. at 271, 552 P.2d at 676.
156. Id. at 279, 552 P.2d at 681.
157. Id. at 278, 552 P.2d at 681.
158. Id. at 279, 552 P.2d at 681. Thus, although the development was accepted at
the local level in all particulars and was potentially of economic benefit to the commu-
nity, the court ordered that an EIS be prepared so that the environment would be pro-
tected. See note 20 supra (discussion of the appropriateness of local decisionmaking).
159. Part I of the checklist is designed to provide the lead agency with background
information about the project to prepare the lead agency for its independent assessment
of the proposal. This portion is not important to test the value of the checklist mecha-
nism, so concentration will be on Part II, which asks the proponent and the lead agency
questions about the impact of the proposal. These questions are designed to be answered
"Yes,"' "No," and "Maybe." WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 197-10-365(2) (1976).
160. The Norway Hill facts would require affirmative answers to the questions
centering on displacement of soil and increased erosion. Air emissions will occur and
objectionable odors might result. Local air movement may be disrupted by the con-
struction. Surface run-off may be altered in its pattern, amount and water quality.
Clearing of the 52 acres might change the diversity of plant and animal species because
natural habitats will be destroyed. Domestic animals will be introduced to the area.
An urban-type development will increase noise levels, produce additional light, and
require an alteration in the present use of the land. Use of natural resources will be in-
creased by the additional housing contemplated for the area. The increase in population
and the construction of streets will increase vehicular traffic and will create demand for
additional parking. Existing transportation systems will be taxed by the alteration of
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less, the completed checklist would have at least thirty-four questions
(approximately sixty percent of the total) which could not be an-
swered in the negative. Such a result should normally indicate that an
EIS should be prepared. The total number of nonnegative answers
would serve as an indication that there was a reasonable probability
the environment would be significantly affected by the development.
This numerical indication alone would justify preparation of an EIS,
especially because balancing of potential impacts or weighting of the
importance of particular checklist questions is forbidden. 161 Thus, the
court's holding in Norway Hill was consistent with the suggested out-
come of the SEPA Guidelines.
The results of the hypothetical completion of a checklist for the
Norway Hill project suggest two possible explanations. The first is re-
lated to weaknesses in the checklist. Three negative declarations by
the King County Council and refusal of the writ of certiorari by the
superior court 162 would seem to indicate that the determination of sig-
nificance was a close case on the facts. If this was so, however, the
checklist, which overwhelmingly supports the decision to require
more extensive review, may be overly protective, conceivably leading
to an unnecessary completion of environmental impact statements
with marginal benefit to society. The Guidelines are too stringent to
be useful if it is possible to answer sixty percent of the questions in the
affirmative and yet still have a borderline case. To correct this prob-
lem, the Guidelines should be rewritten to indicate more clearly their
underlying policy and the threshold which must be attained before a
question is answered in the affirmative.
The second possibility is that the project was in fact significant on
its face, as the court concluded 163 and the Guidelines suggest. The
circulation patterns associated with the development. Increased traffic will customarily
be accompanied by an increase in traffic hazards.
As planned, the community will require an increase in public services which will only
be met by additional use of existing facilities or by new construction. Energy will be
needed for the construction and operation, further taxing existing systems for power,
water, sewage, storm water, and solid wastes.
The facts of the case are not sufficiently detailed to justify conclusions in some areas,
such as aesthetics, recreation, and archeology/history. However, failure to be able to an-
swer these questions should not destroy the utility of the analysis because there are suffi-
cient data to answer a majority of the questions.
161. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 197- 10-360 (1976).
162. 87 Wn. 2d at 270-71, 552 P.2d at 676.
163. Id. at 278, 552 P.2d at 681. Three categories of development are generally re-
garded as being significant on their face: (1) highway projects, Named Individual
Members of the San Antonio Conservation Soc'y v. Texas Highway Dep't, 446 F.2d
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case would then illustrate a recurring problem with local decision-
making-local bias. Although state policy favors reasoned decision-
making, a local agency has power to short-circuit that policy, produc-
ing either unwarranted environmental damage or needless and
expensive litigation. The broad power of judicial review does serve as
a protection against the first consequence of misuse, but there is no
check against the latter.
VI. CONCLUSION
The SEPA Guidelines provide a well-planned, logically ordered ap-
proach to the threshold determination. Problems remain, however,
the most troublesome of which is that the Guidelines do not describe
the point at which an action becomes "significant." They do cover the
essential elements of who, when, what, and how, but do so in such a
vague fashion that the utility of the Guidelines is still in doubt. 64
The courts have also failed to. define specifically the "significantly
affecting" test. In Norway Hill the Washington Supreme Court solidi-
fied its foundation for meaningful judicial review,165 but it offered no
clear a priori guidance in its threshold determination test.
Conservation is a compromise between maximum utilization of re-
sources and staunch environmentalism. A growing society places in-
creasing demands upon resources to supply the products and services
essential to growth. The cost of such growth should not be increased
unreasonably because of policies which fail to reflect public sentiment
1013 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 933 (1972), (2) power projects, Scientists'
Inst. of Pub. Information, Inc. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 481 F.2d 1079 (D.C. Cir.
1973), and (3) other large scale projects such as housing projects, Silva v. Romney, 342
F. Supp. 783 (D. Mass. 1972), dredging, Sierra Club v. Mason, 351 F. Supp. 419 (D.
Conn. 1972), and spraying chemical pesticides or herbicides, Lee v. Resor, 348 F. Supp.
389 (D. Fla. 1972). See Peltz & Weinmen, NEPA Threshold Determinations: A Frame-
work of Analysis, 31 U. MIAMI L. REV. 71 (1976).
164. Amendments to SEPA were proposed during the 1977 legislative session that
would reduce the influence of the Guidelines or would repeal them entirely. WASH. S.B.
2473 & 2953 (1977). These bills document the unrest concerning the utility of the
Guidelines.
165. 87 Wn. 2d 267, 552 P.2d 674 (1976). The Washington Supreme Court con-
firmed its broad powers of review when it decided Sisley v. San Juan County, 89 Wn. 2d
78, 85, 569 P.2d 712, 716-17 (1977). The court stated that it sits as a trial court in re-
viewing the record of the lower courts to determine whether a proposal could reason-
ably be said to have potentially more than a moderate effect on the environment. In
Sisley, the court ordered preparation of an EIS to determine the impact of a marina at
Deer Harbor, but did not discuss the applicability of the procedural elements of the
SEPA Guidelines. Id. at 89, 569 P.2d at 719. Thus, the utility of the "significantly af-
fecting" provisions of the Guidelines have yet to be reviewed or discussed by the court.
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or which are published in an ambiguous manner. The Guidelines
should be re-evaluated to verify their propriety in light of competing
public values. To promote greater certainty and predictability in mak-
ing the threshold determination, they should also be amended to in-
corporate a clearer and more comprehensive statement of the under-
lying state environmental policy.
Even if the legislative reinvestigation of the Guidelines is not
undertaken promptly, problems may be avoided by creative judicial
interpretation and explanation. In Norway Hill the court wisely chose
to adopt a broad, flexible standard for the "significantly affecting"
test by combining a reasonableness test for significance with a review
standard which allows for judicial intervention. This combination will
enable a court to clarify the intent and purpose of the Guidelines. A
court, however, should attempt to do so as soon as possible to avoid
needless expense and uncertainty.
John C. Hammar*
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